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RECENT CASES.
BILLS AND NoTEs-EFFEc" OF "THIS SHALL Bs NEGOTIABLE" ON BILL OR
NoTE-CoNsTRucIoN OF INSTRUMENT-Plaintiff brings action on instrument
which contains provision for confession of judgment, but which does not state

time at which such confession must be made, and which includes the stipulation,
"This note shall be negotiable." Held, that the addition of the words, "this
note shall be negotiable," renders the instrument, otherwise non-negotiable, a
negotiable promissory note. Gray v. Gardner, 12 Pa. D. & C. 449 (1929).
The conclusion reached in the principal case with regard to the particular
instrument involved, i.e., that it is negotiable, would seem to be the correct one,
but the effect of the express words of negotiability would appear only to reenforce the result rather than to serve, as it does in the court's decision, as its
sole basis.' The effect of the words, "this note shall be negotiable," on various
types of commercial paper, however, presents an interesting and, considering
its importance, a surprisingly infrequently treated problem. The addition of
such words on an instrument which is otherwise clearly non-negotiable because of
some fundamental defect in it, such as uncertainty of time or conditionality ot
promise, could hardly make it negotiable, and still be consistent with the well
established doctrine: the legal effect of an instrument must appear not by force
of the mere stipulation of the parties that it shall have such effect, but must
be implied by law as the result of the form and all the provisions of the instrument? The N. I. L. has codified this rule in its opening provision that "an
instrument to be negotiable must conform. to the following requirements." ' If
it does not-if the sum be uncertain or the promise qualified-the legal effect is,
as the one or two cases on the subject have held' that the instrument is nonnegotiable, and no stipulation between the parties of a contrary legal conclusion,
such as, "this note shall be negotiable," can be given any weight whatsoever.
However, these words added to an instrument which would otherwise be nonnegotiable only because of the omission of words of order or of bearer would,
The provision for confession of judgment would, even without the express
words, "this note shall be negotiable," seem to mean at or after maturity, under
the well established rule of construction that where there is an ambiguity on
the face of an instrument, the ambiguity is to be determined rather to sustain
the highest status of the instrument-in this case, its negotiability-than to
destroy it. Thrall v. Newell, 19 Vt. 2o2 (1847) ; CHITmr, TREATISE ON LAW OF
CONTRAcrs (17th ed. 1921) 99.
'Snelling v. Arbuckle Bros., lO4 Ga. 362, 30 S. E. 863 (898)
(A contract
must be construed in the light of all its provisions and the legal outcome of its
stipulations. Words of agency in contract cannot change its legal status as
contract of sale); Kerby v. Charlestown, 78 N. H. 3o, 99 Atl. 835 (1916)
(Same general principle as applied to another field of law: "legal domicile" of
i man is that place which in contemplation of law is his domicile, not that which
he desires or intends to be considered his domicile).
Italics our own.
4

N.I.L.

§i.

Stadler v. First National Bank, 22 Mont. 190, 56 Pac. iii (I898), L. R. A.
19I6B; Second National Bank v. Basuier, 65 Fed. 58 (C. C. A. 8th, 1894)
se-mble.
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according to both authority' and logic, clearly render the instrument negotiable.
The reason for incorporating the requirement of words of order or of bearer into
the N. L L. in the first place, would seem to have been that these were the words
most often used at common law to impart negotiability to a writing; although
text writers and judges rarely stated the proposition that words of order or of
bearer made an instrument negotiable, without adding that other words of
similar purport would have the same effect.' Accordingly, the N. I. L. expressly states that the wording of an instrument, to be negotiable, need not
follow the exact language of the act, provided that there is a clear expression
of an intention to conform to the requirements thereof!' It would therefore
seem that the omission of the words "order" or "bearer" may be cured by the
addition of specific words of negotiability, such as, "this note shall be negotiable."
There being under these circumstances, on the other hand, no positive evidence
of whether the writing was intended to be a "bearer" or an "order" instrument,
the further problem then arises as to whether it is not uncertain as to payee and
consequently non-negotiable under the applicable section of the N. I. L.' However, courts might logically reason from the fact that the maker has named
a particular, payee, failing to specify "bearer" but adding "this note shall be
negotiable," that he intended, in making the promise to a named payee, to give
him the power to negotiate the instrument, such negotiations to be only by
endorsement of the payee named, thus in effect creating what would amount to
an "order" instrument. Finally, where the writing contains a patent ambiguity, one interpretation of which would make it negotiable, the other nonnegotiable, so clear a statement of the intention of the parties as "this note
shall be negotiable," would seem to reenforce the aforementioned rule of construction " and resolve the-ambiguity the more clearly on the side of upholding
the status of the paper as a negotiable instrument." The conclusions reached with
regard to the effect of the words under consideration on each of the above types
of commercial instrument, would seem in each case to meet the requirements
of business for paper that will not only possess the greatest possible degree of
transferability, but will at the same time give the greatest possible weight to the
expressed intention of the maker of the instrument.
6
Essig v. Porter, 63 Ind. App. 318, 112 N. E. ioo5 (1916); Raymond v.
Middleton, 2g Pa. 529 (1858); BRANNON, THE NEGOTIABLA INSTRUMENTS LAW
ANNOTATED (4th ed. 1926) 21; TIEDEMAN, COMMERCIAL, PAPER (1889) § 21.
But Tsee Carruth v. Walker, 8 Wis. 852 (1859).
CHiTTY, BILLs (9th Am. Ed. 1839) 218.
'N. L L. §IO.

'N. LL.§ (5).
"Supra note I.
'Another problem that suggests itself is the effect of these words where
the suit is on the simple contract between the parties. The question of whether
individuals may, in other than negotiable instruments, accord to each other certain of the specific advantages accruing to negotiable paper, such as waiver
of defenses of fraud, set-off, or claims against a subsequent assignee has been
adjudicated both in the negative and in the affirmative. For discussion of
authorities, see BRAN.o.N,,
(.gth ed. T926) II.

THE NEGOTIABLE INs-TRt
uMENTs

L,%w ANNxOTATED

26o

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

BILLS AND NOTES-UNCERTAINTY OF AMOUNT PAYABLE AFTER MATURITY
A S AFFECTING NEGOTIABILITY-Suit by an indorsee against the maker on a

promissory note which contained the following interest provisions: "with interest thereon at the rate of eight percent. per annum from date until fully paid.
Interest payable semi-annually .
Deferred payments are to bear interest
from maturity at ten per cent. per annum semi-annually." Held, that the note
was non-negotiable, the sum payable being uncertain due to the irreconcilable
interest provisions. First National Bank of Miami, Fla. v. Bosler, 297 Pa.
353, 147 Ati. 74 (1929).
A fundamental requisite of every negotiable instrument under both the "law
merchant" and the present Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law is that it
contain "an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money." '
It is still unsettled, however, as to whether it is essential that such certainty
be present after as well as at the time of maturity.' Prior to the unanimous
adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law, this question usually arose in
most states in connection with the negotiability of instruments containing a
provision for the payment of reasonable attorneys' fees for their collection;
but this problem having been settled by the N. 1. L.,' the point has apparently
not been before the courts in recent years. Adopting the court's view that
"until fully paid" here meant both before and after maturity, and that "deferred
payments" referred to all sums maturing in the future, i. e., postponed payments
of both interest and principal, this case would seem to raise directly the problem
presented above, since any uncertainty or conflict must necessarily concern the
interest which is to be payable after maturity.' The Pennsylvania court concludes that the sum must be certain "at any given date" and by its holding in
the principal case would seem to include certainty subsequent to, as well as at
the date of maturity, as essential to negotiability. Such conclusion is in line
with the theory adopted by the same court in respect to provisions for attorneys' fees before the passage of the N. I. L. in Pennsylvania.' Yet there is a
great deal both in logic and in authority to be said for the contrary proposition.
In the first place a note after maturity is not, in the full sense of the word,
still a negotiable instrument; although it is still transferable, it has lost that
great characteristic which gives value to it as commercial paper, namely, the
'Smith v. Nightingale,

Stark. N. P. 375 (Eng. 1818); Ayrey v. FeamINSTRUMENTS LAW, § I (2).
'The conflicting theories usually advanced are: (I) "the amount due on
a note is certain when there is no date at which the cxact amount then due cannot
be ascertained by inspection and computation;" (2) "such a degree of certainty
is required that the exact amount to become due and payable at any future time
must be clearly ascertainable at the date of the note, uninfluenced by any
condition not certain of fulfilment," Merrill v. Hurley, 6 S. D. 592, 599, 62
N. W. 958, 96o (895) ; Jones v. Rodatz, 27 Minn. 240 (i88o) ; (3) uncertainty
is immaterial after default, Oppenheimer v. Bank, 97 Tenn. 19 (1896).
'§ 2 (5). See also Note L. R. A. ipi6B 675.
'As to the negotiability of instruments containing provisions merely for
increased interest after maturity, see: (924)
72 U. OF PA. L. REv. 190.
A
provision for interest on overdue interest does not impair negotiability: Barker
v. Sartori, 66 Wash. 26o, i19 Pac. 611 (1911) ; Cherry v. Sprague, 187 Mass.
113, 72 N. E. 456 (19o5) ; Gilmore v. Hirst, 56 Kan. 626, 44 Pac. 6o3 (1896).
'Wood v. North, 84 Pa. 407 (1877) ; Johnston v. Speer, 92 Pa. 227 (1879).
2

sides, 4 M. & W. 168 (Ex. 1838) ; NEGOTIABLE
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ability to circulate freely with the transferee able to acquire greater rights than
the transferor had.' Thus it has been argued, the sum due thereafter is immaterial, if the amount due at maturity be commercially ascertainable, since the
necessary certainty is satisfied for the time during which the note can be successfully negotiated as a substitute for money7 Furthermore, this theory is
impliedly sanctioned in the Uniform, Act by the incorporation into Sec. 2 of
this view regarding attorneys' fees; 8 the court, although well within the language of the Act in its decision, seems to have repudiated the reasoning responsible for this provision. In addition, it may reasonably be considered whether
the discrepancy created by these two interest provisions discloses such a degree
of uncertainty as would impair the function of the note as a negotiable instrument in the judgment of business men, a factor which has ultimately been
decisive in the history of negotiable instruments0 The case raises the point
in a fashion unique in the law of bills and notes and would seem to betray an
unlooked-for gap in the Uniform Act.

CONTRACTS-CONSIDERATION-REQUIREMENTS THEREOF IN CIVIL AND COMLAw-The plaintiff sold and delivered goods to the defendant. Later
plaintiff agreed to take back the goods. In a suit for breach of the contract
of sale the defendant set up the agreement to take them back as a defense.
Plaintiff maintained that the agreement was void because it was without consideration. Held, that the hope of retaining the good will of his customer was
a sufficient consideration to sustain the promise to accept the return of the
merchandise. Marx and Sons v. Leichner, 121 So. 685 (La. 1928).
Once a contract has been executed, so that any remaining obligations are
vested in but one of the parties, an agreement by the other party to rescind must
be based on a new consideration.! Our law is not by any means settled as
to what constitutes valid legal consideration,' but the rules are at least definite
MON

'Towne v. Rice, 122 Mass. 67 (1877) (where it was held that the fact that
the realization of certain collateral securities would affect the amount to be due
on a note atter maturity, would not impair its negotiability) ; Dorsey v. Wolff,
142 Ill. 589 (1892).
'Farmers' Nat. Bank of Valparaiso, Ind. v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 52 Fed. 191
(C. C. A. 6th, I8g:) ; Capital City State Bank v. Swift, 29o Fed. 505 (E.D.
Okl. 1923); DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, (6th ed. 1913) § 62a.

8 'The rule" as adopted by the N. I. L. "is based upon the view that as
long as the amount payable is certain up to the time of maturity, it is not
essential that after that time, when the instrument has become nonnegotiable
for other reasons, the certainty as to amount should continue." Hutson v.
Rankin, 36 Idaho I69, 173, 213 Pac. 345, 346 (1922).
See discussion by Amidon, J., in Cudahy Packing Co. v. State Nat. Bank

of Saint Louis, 134 Fed. 538, 542 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o4).

'Baltimore Refrigerating Co. v. Wetzel, 162 Fed. 117 (C. C. A. 4th, I9O8);
Renner v. Luchow, 28o S. W. 77 (Mo. App. 1926); Hatchell v. Odom, i9
N, C. 302 (1837) ; 2 BLACx RF-scISSION AND CANCELLATION (2d ed. 1929)
§ 523.
0 Willis, What is Consideration in the Anglo-American Law of Contracts?
(1924) 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. 245.

262

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

enough to make it indeed singular for a court to hold such a vague thing as a
mere hope of retaining a customer's good will as valid consideration for a
promise. The principal case having been decided in Louisiana where the civil
law is of importance sheds an interesting light on the requirements of consideration in civil as compared with common law. In the former, all that is required
to make a contract binding is that it have an honest causa;3 causa simply
meaning the end the party has in view,4 or as defined in the Louisiana Civil
Code,' "the consideration or motive for making it." Thus all the consideration
needed for a promise to make a gift is the aninnus donandi6 and the promise
to the creditor of another to pay the debt is satisfied by the existence of the
debt.7 As between the civil and common law requisites, it is apparent that
the latter is the narrower, for it requires both causa, in the sense of a lawful
object, and consideration." How this requirement of consideration came into
the common law is difficult to explain. Its history is bound up with the history
of the action of assumpsit and it seems impossible to refer consideration to a
single source9 The tendency of our law to-day seems to be to break away from
these narrower rules of consideration and to give more weight to the intent
and motive of the parties in the manner of the civil law. Thus the courts
in this country sustain charitable subscriptions, not upon valid consideration,
but for a variety of reasons emanating from principles of public policy'
Some courts' go beyond this category and sustain purely gratuitous promises
upon which the promisee has relied, by the peculiar doctrine of promissory
estoppel, though it would seem that one could not turn a gratuitous promise into
a contract by the mere acting upon it. The estoppel doctrine is favored by the
Restatement " where injustice cannot other.vise be avoided. Likewise a growing
number of states " now consider benefit to the promisor, of itself, sufficient where
the promisee merely does an act he is already under contractual obligation to
a third person to perform. The Restatement" also favors this view. Statutes
of divers types have been passed,' some entirely abolishing the need of con'Walton, Causa.and Considerationin Contracts (1925) 41 L. Q. REv. 306.
'Walton, op. cit. supra note 3, at 317.
'LA.'REv. Civ. CODE (Saunder's 2d ed. I92O) Art. i896.
'Walton, op. cit. supra note 3, at 318.
'New Orleans and Carrolton R. Co. v. Chapman, 8 La. An. 97 (1853).
' Walton, op. cit. supra note 3, at 325; Lorentzen, Causa and Consideration
in the Law of Contracts (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 639.
"Ames, The History of Assumpsit (I888) 2 HARv. L. REv. I, 53.
-'WILUSTON, CONTRACTS (1926) § I6.
'Wilson v. Spry, 145 Ark. 21, 223 S. W. 564 (igzo) ; Switzer v. Gertenbach, 122 Ill. App. 26 (i9o5) ; Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 5i, 77 N. IV. 365
(i898) ; Phalen v. U. S. Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 178, 78 N. E. 943 (906) ; Cf.
DeCicco v. Schweizer, 221 N. Y. 431, 117 N. E. 8o7 (917).
"CONTACTs RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. rq28) § go.
"Hirsch v. Chicago Carpet Co., 82 Il1. App. (1899) ; Donnelly v. Newbold,
94 Md. 220, 5o At. 513 (q0o)
; Abbot v. Doane, 163 Mass. 433, 4o N. E. 197
(1895) ; Avondale Marble Co. v. Wiggins, T2 Pa. Super. 577 (900).
" CONTRAcrs RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) § 84 (d).
"WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1926) § 218.
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6
sideration on any written contractY The Uniform Writte. Obligations Act,
adopted in penpsylvania in 1927,' gives force to the party's real intent by
providing that a written contract is binding if it contains an additional statement
that the party intends to be bound," Since these statutes are of recent origin,
their efficacy can not as yet be determined. Perhaps in the end, a partial or
complete adoption of catsa in lieu of consideration will be found to be the
most satisfactory solution of the problem.

CRIMINAL LAw--APPLICATION OF "RIGHT AND WRONG TEST" To DETERMINE CAPACITY TO COMMIT CRimEs REQUIRING A CRIMINAL INTENT-The de-

fendant, armed with a revolver, committed a robbery for which he was tried
upon an indictment for robbery. The jury found that he had been insane at the
precise time the offense was committed. Later an indictment based upon the
same acts contained in the robbery indictment was brought against the defendant
for carrying concealed deadly weapons. Held, that the verdict of insanity in the
robbery prosecution did not operate as an acquittal and was not decisive of the
defendant's sanity in the second prosecution. People v. Perry, 277 Pac. lo8o
(Cal. 1929).
One of the fundamental principles of the criminal law of every statutory
or common law crime, with the exception of public nuisances and breaches of
what are commonly described as police regulations,' is that there must be a concurrence of an act and a particular state of mind.' A particular state of mind
or mental element, variously named by writers,' thus becomes an essential ingredient of most crimes. Many dissimilar states of mind, however, are involved
in the different offenses. The malice aforethought required in murder is different from the aaims furandi of larceny, and the latter differs from the negligence required for involuntary manslaughter and the intent to burn necessary
for arson.' It is obvious that if the mental element required for the particular
offepse with which the defendant is charged was wanting, he was incapable of
committing that crime, Because insanity represents this absence of the mental
element, it is considered, in the jurisprudence of 1ll civilized nations, to be a
defense against punishment for crime. Of all the tests of this incapacity to
commit crime by reason of insanity that have been advanced, the "right and
"'IDAHO REV. STAT. (igo8) §3314; N. M. ANN.
2182; WYo. CoISP. STAT, (910) §§ 3641, 3642.
' 1927 P. L. 985; PA. STAT. (Supp. 1928) § i6oI6a.
" See Note (i9;8) 76 U. OF PA, L. REV. 58o.

CODE

(I915)

§§218i,

Commonwealth v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 202 Mass. 394, 88 N. E. 764 (1909).
The mere act of selling oleomargarine is all that is required under the statute,
consequently intent is of no importance. State v. Rippeth, 71 Ohio St. 85, 72
N. E. :298 (1904).
a MixEL, CLARX oN CRImEs (3d ed. 1915) 48, 6o.
'Keedy, Insanity and Crimibial Responsibility (1917) 30 HARV. L. REV.
535, 537.
I Ibid. 45Q.
'Smoor, LAw OF INSANITY 372 (1929).
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wrong test" announced by the English courts in McNaughteozs Case' has been
generally adhered to in the United States ' and England.0 Briefly, the rule states
that if from disease of the mind, the defendant does not know the nature and
quality of the particular act which he is doing, or if he does know it, that he did
not know that it was wrong, he cannot be guilty of the crime. The defendant
under this rule may be possessed of sufficient mentality to have the malice essential to murder, whereas he may be unable to know the nature and quality of his
particular acts so as to have the intent to steal which is necessary in larceny.
In other words, because a different mental element is required in various crimes,
a verdict of insanity as to one crime is not decisive of the defendant's sanity
in another crime, notwithstanding both crimes may have grown out of the same
transactions and have been committed at the same time.' This principle enunciated by the court in the Perry case consequently is sound both on principle
and authority. The court in this case, however, erroneously assumed that
a verdict of insanity did not amount to an acquittal in the robbery prosecution.'0
As a result an absolutely correct rule regarding the application of the "right
and wrong test" was based upon an untenable proposition as to the effect of
the verdict of insanity in the determination of the question before the court.

DAMAGES-MFEASURE

OF

DAMAGES

FOR

CONVERSION

Pennsylvania statute provides: "In any proceeding

.

.

OF
.

SECURrIES-A

in which damages

are claimed for the conversion of stocks, bonds, or other like property of
fluctuating value, the damages shall be limited to the difference between the
proceeds of the conversion, or that portion thereof duly paid or credited to the
owner, and such higher value as the property may have reached within a reasonable time after he had notice of the conversion ..

. "

Pa. Act of April

P. L. 476.
The decisions are in sharp conflict on the problem of the measure of damages for the conversion of securities of fluctuating value. In England the
measure of damages is the value of the securities at the time of trial if the
price has risen'- and the value at the time of conversion if the price has declined.' A few states limit the damages to the value of the shares at the time
io, 1929,

io Cl. & F. 2oo (Eng. 1843).

'State v Cooper,

17o N. C. 719, 87 S. E. 50 (1915) ; State v. James, 96
N. J.8 L. 132, 114 Atd. 553 (1921) ; (1923) 72 U. OF PA. L. REV. i68.

Rex. v. Quamby, I5 Cr. App. Rep. 163 (Eng. 1920).
'Cf. People v. Kelley, 7 Cal. App. 554, 95 Pac. 45 (0908).
" People v. Kelley, supra note 9. The court based its proposition as to the
effect of a verdict of insanity upon certain California statutes. These statutes
cited by the court in its decision do not treat the effect of a verdict of insanity
and state that it is not an acquittal. CAL. ConEs AND GEN. LAWS (Supp. 1927)
149;

SmOOT,

op. cit. supra note 5, at 378.

'For an extended review of the authorities see Note (1929) 77 U. of PA.
L. REV. 682.
' Owen v. Routh, r4 C. B. 327 (Eng. 1854) ; Murray v. Hewitt, 2 T. L. R.
872 (Eng. 1886).
'Sanders v. Kentish, 8 T. R. 162 (Eng. 1799).
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of conversion. Some of the cases hold that the highest intermediate value Of
the shares between the time of conversion and the trial is recoverable.' A constantly increasing number of jurisdictions have adopted the so-called New
York rule which assesses damages at the highest value of the securities between the time the injured person has notice of the conversion and a reasonable
time thereafter' Gervis v. Kay7 which purported to adopt the New York rule
in Pennsylvania, expressly limited its application to instances of conversion
resulting from honest mistake. The statute very properly seeks to extend that
salutary rule to cases of wilful conversion.8 It thereby accepts in toto a settled
principle of the law of damages that it is the duty of the aggrieved person to
do all that reasonably may be required of him to minimize the loss.' Moreover,
by denying recovery of an increase in price between the time of the conversion
and notice thereof,"' it settles the Pennsylvania law on a point heretofore
doubtful.11 The statute makes no provision for dividends or interest and thus
tacitly retains, it would seem, the established rule under the New York doctrine
which allows the injured party only dividends from. the conve'sion until the
expiration of a reasonable time and interest alone thereafter until the date of
trial.' Doubtless it does not affect the principle that when the value of the
securities has declined the value at the time of conversion is recoverable'

INTERNAL REVENuE-APPLICABI-.ITY OF TAXING STATUTE IN ENFORCEMENT

OF PENAL Acrs-PovIsIONS OF HARRISON ANTi-N~ACOTIc AcT-Owner, op-

erating his automobile, was apprehended while vending cocaine without having
paid the special tax, registering, etc., as required by the Harrison Anti-Narqotic
' Continental Divide Mining Inv. Co. v. Bliley, 23 Colo. 160, 46 Pac. 633
(I896) ; Bank of Baltimore v. Harris, 77 Md. 423, 26 Atl. 523 (1893) ; Boylan
v. Huguet, 8 Nev. 345 (1873).
r2 SEDawicK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) ioi6; 4 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES
( 4 th ed. igi6) 4239.
' Galigher v. Jones, 129 U. S. 193, 9 Sup. Ct 335 (1888) ; Mayer v. Monzo,
221 N. Y. 42, 17 N. E. 948 (1917);

S. W. 9I (1922).
7294

Pa. 518, 144 Aft.

Hedges v. Burke, 147 Tenn. 247, 247

529 (1928).

'For the effect of wilfulness on the measure of damages for conversion of
chattels of non-fluctuating value see 4 SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra n6te 5, at
4214.

'See L. R. A. I917C 747, 754.
"Accord: Burnham v. Lawson, 118 App. Div. 389, IO3 N. Y. Supp. 482
(907).

'Many cases which purport to apply the New York rule, including Gervis
v. Kay, supra note 7, at 525, I44 Atl. at 531, loosely state it as giving the highest
value between the conversion and a reasonable time after notice. Newburger
Cotton Co. v. Stevens, 167 Ark. 257, 262, 267 S. W. 777, 778 (1925) (conversion
of cotton); Weaver v. Commercial Savings Bank, 222 Mich. 337, 340, 192
N. W. 578, 579 (1923).

'Doyle v. Burns, 123 Iowa 488, 99 N. W. 195 (r9o4). As to dividends
and interest under the other views see 5 FL rcER, CORPORATIoNS (1918) 5677.
"3McIntyre v. Whitney, 139 App. Div. 557, 124 N. Y. Supp. 234 (I9IO),
off'd, 2o N. Y. 526, 94 N. E. io96 (r91).
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Act and its amendments.'
Forfeiture proceedings were brought against the
automobile under a section of the Internal Revenue Law' which broadly
provides for the forfeiture of all vehicles used in the removal of property with
intent to defraud the government of the tax thereon. Held, that the provisions
of the Internal Revenue Law are inconsistent with those of the Harrison AntiNarcotic Act and cannot be invoked in its enforcement. United States v. One
Studebaker Roadster, 31 F. (2d) 488 (W. D. Pa. 1928).'
The court in arriving at its decision found very little precedent to support
it. The federal courts, although frequently confronted with the problem,
have in nearly every instance chosen to evade it and decide against a forfeiture
by reason of some different principle.' The court in United States v. Mangano,"
a decision relied on primarily by the court in the principal case, was the first
to meet the problem squarely, and to determine the question involved conclusively.' That court reasoned that since the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act,
as amended, contains specific penalties for violation of its provisions by way
of forfeiture of the narcotics,7 and fine or imprisonment,8 and such being
different from the punishment imposed by the Internal Revenue Law, they are
inconsistent; and by rule of statutory construction the later statute is held to
supersede or repeal by implication, pro tanto, the former.' A somewhat similar
problem has arisen in respect to the applicability of that same section of the
Internal Revenue Law in the enforcement of the penal provisions of the National Prohibition Act." Before the enactment of the Willis-Campbell Act
of 19i, ' and for a few years thereafter, much confusion and difference of
opinion existed as to whether the forfeiture provisions of the Internal Revenue
138 STAT. 785 (1914), 26 USCA §§ 2-1, 691-7o8 (1928).

14 STAT. 151 (1866), 26 USCA § 1181 (1928).
'Approved and ,followed in United Statel v. One Victoria Nash Coupe, 31
F. (2d) 490 (W. D. Pa. 1929).
'United States v. Premier Automobile, 297 Fed. 10O7 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924)
(held no removal as required under Internal Revenue Act) ; United States v.
Kissel Automobile, 296 Fed. 688 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924) (held no intent to defraud
of tax).

52g9 Fed. 492 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924).

6 It is interesting to note two cases decided after the Mangano case, supra

note 5, in which the court, presented with the same question, avoided it and
based its decision on other legal principles. See Cadillac Automobile v. United
States, 7 F. (2d) 102 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925) ; United States v. Pontiac Coupe,
25 F. (2d) 755 (S.D. Tex. 1928).
7 42 STAT. 300 (1921), 26 USCA § 693 (1928).
a38 STAT. 789 (914),
26 USCA § 705 (1928).
' United States v. Mangano, supra note 5 at 494; United States v. One
Bay Horse and One Buggy, 128 Fed. 207, 208 (N. D. I1. 19o4) (forfeiture
provision of Internal Revenue Law repealed as concerns tax on oleomargarine,
statute providing a more limited forfeiture).
"0Buckley, Forfeiture of Vehicles for Unlawful Movement of LiquorUnder the National Prohibition Act-Under the Revised Statutes (1924) 4
B. U. L. REv. 183.
1142 STAT. 223 (1921), 27 USCA § 3 (1928) sec. 5 of which provides that
the old laws in regard to the manufacture, taxation and traffic in intoxicating
liquor and their penalties shall continue in force except such provisions as are
directly in conflict with the National Prohibition Act.
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Law were impliedly repealed in respect to intoxicating liquor by those of the
National Prohibition Act' which contains less drastic penalties in that the
rights of innocent third persohls in the vehicle condemned are fully protected.'
Some courts ruled that inasmuch, as the forfeiture provisions of' both statutes
cover the same ground and the later provides a less severe penalty, the earlier
statute is superseded by the later 4 Others held that there was no repeal, declaring either that the- two laws do not cover the same subject matter and,
therefore, cannot be incoflsistent, or that the Willis-Campbell Act reenacted
the earlier statute if it had been repealed." The controversy was finally settled
by a Supreme Court decision' which accepted the reasoning of those cases
holding that the earlier statute was still applicable, As a result of this decision,
the courts almost universally hold that forfeiture proceedings may.be brought
under the Internal Revenue Law as long as the occupants of the vehicle have
not been prosecuted under the National Prohibition Act. In the absence of
statutory provision similar to the Willis-Campbell Act supplementing the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, the court in the principal case was entirely justified
in denying a forfeiture since it is not within the province of a court to inflict
punishment for an offense other than that which the legislature saw fit to
impose.

INTERNATIONAL LAw-ABROGATION OF JAY TREATY BY WAR OF 1812CONSTRUCrION OF IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1924-Appellants, British subjects,
residents but not natives of Canada, working in the United States, were denied
admission thereto under Section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1924.' Appellants
claim right of entry under Article 3 of Jay Treaty of 1794,' providing for
free passage and repassage across Canadian border by citizens of both countries,
and under Section 3 (2) of the Immigration Act, providing that aliens visiting
the United States temporarily for business or pleasure are not immigrants
under the Act. Held, that Article 3 of the Jay Treaty was annulled by the
324I STAT. 315 (1919), 27

USCA § 40 (1928).
"For discussion of forfeiture of vehicles of innocent owners used in
liquor transportation, see note (1925) 74 U. OF PA. L. Iv. 17o, and note
(1924) 71 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 181.
"United States v. One Haynes Automobile, 274 Fed. 926 (C. C.\A. 5th,
192i) ; McDowell v. United States, 286 Fed. 521 (C, C. A. 9th, 1923) ; United
States v. One Chevrolet Coupe, 9 F. (2d) 85 (E. D. Mo. 1925).
'United States v. One Essex Touring Auto, 266 Fed. 138 (N. D. Ga.
192o) ; Reo Atlanta Co. v. Stern, 279 Fed. 422 (N. D. Ga. 1922).
"United States v. One Ford Coupe 3 F. (2d) 64 (W. D. La. 1924);
United States v. One White Truck, 4 F. (2d) 413 (W. D. Wash. 1925).
' United States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U. S. 321, 47 Sup. Ct. 154 (1926).
"8United States v. Chevrolet Truck, 30 F. (2d) 830 (E. D. Mich. 1929);
Richbourg Motor Co. v. United States, 34 F. (2d) 38 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
Contra: United States v, General Motors Acceptance Corp., 25 F. (2d) 238
(C. C. A. 5th, 1928).
IImMiGnATioN ACT OF 1924, c. t9o, 43 STAT. 153, 154, 8 U. S. C. 4 203

(1926).
2
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OF A.ITY, CoMMEaRCE AND NAVIGATION, 8 STAT. 16.

268

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

War of 1812, and that laborers for hire do not come within the purview of
Section 3 (2) of the Immigration Act. Karnuth v. United States, 49 Sup. Ct.
274 (U. S. 1929).

It is today generally conceded that war annuls only those treaties incompatible with a state of hostility. Hence Article 3 of the Jay Treaty, aiming at harmony, alliance, and peaceful intercourse-all utterly inconsistent with
a state of war---could not survive.4 As to Article 3. therefore, and all other
sections of the Jay Treaty, whose desideratum was likewise the establishment
of peaceful relations and political amity,' the war of 1812 was a cause of final
extinction.' The further controversy concerns two problems of statutory
construction. (I) Does "business" under the Immigration Act include "labor
for hire"?' (2) Is Section 3 of the Act, defining an immigrant as "any alien
departing from any place outside the United States destined for the United
States," to be construed as incorporating by implication the accepted definition
of an immigrant as an alien who intends to establish a permanent residence?'
An affirmative answer to either question establishes appellants' right to enter
by placing them outside the scope of the Act, since if "labor for hire" is "business", then the appellants come within the purview of Section 3 (2) of the
Act, and if an immigrant is defined as above, then certainly the appellants are
not immigrants. The Congressional intent, which, when established, decides
both questions, may be definitely ascertained from the reports accompanying
the several bills restricting immigration, in which reports the proposition is
clearly set forth that the heretofore enormous volume of immigration has
been responsible, in large measure, for widespread unemployment,' and a
lowered wage scale and standard of livin-Y" The reports also point out that
' (1929)

77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1030 treats the general question of treaty

abrogation by war. A more extended discussion, citing views of nations and
writers, is found in 5 MooRE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (19o6) § 779.
42 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1922)

§ 550;

HALT, INTERNATIONAL LAW

(7th ed. 1917) 401.
' On the other hand, Article 9 of the Jay Treaty, which provides that
citizens of one country, holding land in the other, shall not be regarded as
aliens, has been held, both in England and the United States, as not affected by
the War of 1812. Sutton v. Sutton, I Russ. & M. 663 (Eng. 1830) ; Techt v.
Hughes,

229

N. Y. 222, 128 N.

E.

185 (1920).

'The conclusion reached above is unquestionably correct, despite the stipulation in Article 28 that the first ten articles should be permanent since a fair

construction, from the context of the treaty, is that "permanent" was used,
not as synonymous with "perpetual", but in opposition to a period expressly
limited. Sutton v. Sutton, supra note 5, reached a similar conclusion.
'The instant case arose when the Commissioner of Immigration ruled
"labor for hire" was not "business" under the Act. Department of Labor,
General Order No. 86, issued on April I, 1927, effective July I, 1927. Before
the ruling, Canadians working in this country were permitted to enter without
objection.
a See Moffitt v. U. S., 128 Fed. 375, 380 (C. C. A. 9th, 1904); Ex parte
Hoffman, 179 Fed. 839, 841 (C. C. A. 2d, 191o).
'H. oF R. REP. 4, 67th Cong. ist Sess. pp. 3, 7; ibid. REP. 1621, 4th Sess.
See, also, HALL, IMMIGRATION (1905) 123; JENKS & LAUCK, IT'IMIGRATION
PROBLEM (1912) 188.
"U. S. IMMIGRATION C0a.lISSlON, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOM-.MENDATIONS

(1910) 37; JENKS & LAUCK, op. cit. supra note 9. 190, 195.
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another serious evil found in the then existing type of immigration was the
growing tendency to seek entrance in quest, not of permanent residence, but
of temporary profitable employment.x It seems unlikely, therefore, that Congress intended, in admitting aliens temporarily for business, to permit their
entrance for purposes of competition with American labor, whose protection
the Act intended to secure." The word "business", in the light of the causes
and purposes of the Act, must be construed, not as including "labor for hire",
but rather as synonymous with "commercial intercourse". Nor can it be supposed that Congress intended the common and dictionary definition of "immigrant" set forth above, since it would largely nullify the contemplated protective effects of the Act by subjecting American workmen to competition from
a transient labor that Congress deemed undesirable. It is rather to be assumed
that Congress intended the literal import of the words embodied in the Act,
which would include all entrants, whether coming for temporary or permanent
residence. On the whole, the unavoidable conclusion is that the act was not
only intended to include the appellants, but that Congress directed the legislation especially at the type of alien represented by them.

MORTGAGES-REMEDIES

OF

MORTGAGEE

AGAINST

PURCHASER

OF SEVERED

REAL FROm MORTGAGoR-Defendant removed several gasoline tanks
from premises which were subject to a mortgage held by complainant. Defendant did not claim under mortgagor, nor was the removal authorized by
either party to the mortgage. Held, that a receiver be appointed to effect the
return of the tanks to the mortgaged premises, Nat'l. Bank v. Hager Oil Co.,
146 AUt. 878 (N. J. 1929).
The above case suggests the problem: what, if any, are the rights of a
mortgagee against a purchaser for value ,from mortgagor of a chattel real,
originally annexed to the mortgaged realty but severed by the mortgagor?
At common law' a mortgage acted as a conveyance in fee of the mortgaged
premises, subject to the revestment in the mortgagor upon payment of the
debt from which the mortgage arose. In those states following the common
law principle,2 the mortgagee has title, and in the question presented above, can
bring replevin or trover, provided the chattel is not again annexed to realty
CHATTEL

' S. REP. 17, 67th Cong. ist Sess. p. 4; FAIRCULD, IMMIGRATION (1916) 193.
' H. OF RL REP. 350, 68th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 23; LEWIS, AmERICA: NATION
OR CONFUSION
1

(1925)

C. 1.

For a presentation of the common law view see I JONES, MORTGAGES (2nd
ed. 1879) § II; 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2nd ed. 192o) § 6oo.
2
Dorr v. Dudderar, 88 Ill.1O7 (1878) ; Searle v. Sawyer, 127 Mass. 491
(879); Mosher v. Vehue, 77 Me. I69 (1885); Howe v. Wadsworth, 59 N. H.
397 (1879) ; Gill v. Weston, iio Pa. 312, I At. 921 (1885) ; also see I JONES,
op. cit. supra note I, § 17 et seq. as to the views of the several states on this
point.
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by vendee 3 However, equitable principles have weakened the mortgagee's position decidedly,' and in most jurisdictions,5 it is held that the mortgagee has only
a lien on the property, title thereto remaining in the mortgagor. In such jurisdictions, replevin and trover cannot be brought by the mortgagee, since he has
not the requisite title-and this conclusion is reached by several of the "title
states"' on the ground that title is in the mortgagee only in his relation to the
mortgagor. In these "lien states" there is a wide discrepancy of view as to
whether or not the lien on the chattel holds in the hands of the vendee. In
some 7 it is held that the lien is lost; in at least two,8 the lien applies only where
the vendee had actual notice of the mortgage, while in Ohio,' if the mortgage
is recorded, the lien holds against vendee if the value of the property has been
reduced, by the severance, to a degree rendering it less than the amount of the
debt, on the ground of constructive notice. In all states holding that the lien
is not lost " the vendee is similarly charged with constructive notice of the
mortgage if recorded. Connecticut, however, paradoxically holds that vendee
has constructive notice of the mortgage," but that the lien is lost.' It is submitted that, only where the nature o~f the chattel would strongly suggest its
relation to realty, and would normally put the vendee upon inquiry as to a
possible mortgage of same, should the doctrine of constructive notice be invoked. Where, however, the vendee has actual notice of the mortgage it is
only just that the lien should hold against the chattel in his possession.

NEGLIGENCE-COMMON PuRPOsE AND JOINT ENTERPRISE IN PENNSYLVANIA
-PASSENGER
OF PRIVATE VEHIcLE-Action by passenger in private automobile

against driver for injuries caused by running car into the side of a moving
train. Held, inter alia, instruction regarding a joint enterprise was unnecessary,
since, although the parties were going to a common destination to bowl, they
were going to play on different teams and in different games; and, further,
that there was no evidence that the passenger had any voice in the control,
management, or direction of the vehicle. Hilton v. Blose, 147 Atl. ioo, ioi
(Pa. 1929).
With the possible exception of total absence of care on the part of the
'Pierce v. Goddard, 39 Mass. 559 (839).
'See Durfee, The Lien or Equitable Theory of the Mortgage--Some Generalizations (1912) io MICH. L. REv. 587.
' See I JONES, loc. cit. supra note 2.
N.

"McKelvey v. Creevey, 72 Conn. 464, 45 Atl. 4 (i9oo) ; Verner v. Betz, 46
Eq. 256, ig AtI. 206 (i89o).

J.

1 Buckout v. Swift, 27 Cal. 433 (1865); Harris v. Bannon, 78 Ky. 568
(188o).
'Hamlin v. Parsons, 12 Minn. io8 (1866); Wilson v. Maltby, 59 N. Y.
126 (1874).
'Smith v. Altick, 24 Ohio St. 369 (1873).
"Hutchins v. King, 68 U. S. 53 (1863) ; Johnson v. Bratton, 112 Mich.

319, 70 N. W. io2i (1897).
' McKelvey v. Creevey, supra note 6.
'Cooper v. Davis, 15 Conn. 556 (1843).
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passenger in the face of a known danger, the question of what circumstances
must be present to bar the passenger of a private vehicle from recovery for
injuries brought about by the concurrent negligence of his driver and a third
person is in a far from settled condition;' and this seems particularly true in
Pennsylvania. This result here has been brought about -prinfcipally by vague
and ambiguous dicta, as in the instant case; by too broad an extension of the
term "common purpose"; 2 bnd by contradictory holdings as to what standard
of conduct the passenger 'must adhere in order that he may not be denied a
recovery on the ground of "contributory negligence"
It has been properly
held that to constitute a "joint enterprise", in which the negligence of the driver
will be imputed to the passenger, such a relationship must be shown between
them that the passenger may be said to actually control or to have the legal
right to control the operation of the vehicle.' However, there is a line of cases
where the element of control apparently has not been considered and where
recovery by the passenger has been denied on the ground that the parties
had a "common purpose" in making the trip ;f in which cases the court says,
in effect: We will not grant a recovery; not because the negligence of his
driver is imputed to the plaintiff, but because the plaintiff himself was negligent
in failing to exercise the same degree of care as isrequired of the driveri.e., where the court can find a "common purpose" the standard of care required
of the passenger is set so high as to bring about substantially ihe same result
as would be effected were his driver's negligence to be imputed to him,
and imputed negligence is expressly ruled out. Confusion must necessarily
I See (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 676; (1926) 12 VA. L. REv. 341; I
BIIEs (6th ed. 1929) § 624 et seq.; HUDDY, AUTOMoBaLEs (Curtis'
ed. 1924) § 8oo el seq.
- Martin v. P. R. R., 265 Pa. 282, io8 Atl. 631 01919) (returning from ball
game), citing Henderson v. P. R. R., 179 Fed. 577, 582 (C. C. A. 3d, igio)
(common purpose of pleasure ride) H
Hoffman v. P. & L. E. R. R., 278 Pa. 246,
122 Atl. 274 (923)
(fellow servants), with which compare Stoker v. Tri-City
Ry., 182 Iowa IO9O, 165 N. W. 30 (1918) ; McKernan v. Detroit, etc., Ry., 138

BERuY, AjTOm

Mich. 519, ioi N. W. 812 (19o4).
3

262
720

Vocca v. P. R. R.,

Pa.

242, 105

259 Pa. 42, io2 At. 283 (1917) ; Azinger v. P. R. R.,
Atl. 87 (I918) ; Davis v. Amer. Ice Co., 285 Pa. 177, 131 Atl.

(1926) all cautioning against 'back-seat driving", while in Martin v. P. R.
R, supra note 2; and Hill v. P. R. T. Co., 271 Pa. 232, 114 At. 634 (92)
failure to interfere with driver barred a recovery. In the Azinger case the
passenger was not held responsible for dangers he might have, but did not see;
while in the Hill case he was held negligent because he did not maintain vigilance
and see them. (1921) 31 YALE L. J. ioi.
'Mann v. Weiand, 81* Pa. 243 (875) ; Wade v. W. M. Ry., 220 Pa. 578,
69 Atl. 1112, (19o8); Kammerdiener v. Rayburn Twp., 233 Pa. 328, 82 Atl.
464

(1912);

Trumbower v. L. V. T. Co., 235 Pa. 397, 84 Atl. 403 (1912);

Dean v. P. R. R., 129 Pa. 514, I8 Atl. 718 (1889) ; Proctor v. L. V. T. Co., 235
Pa. 373, 83 At. IOI9 (1912); Eline v. W. M. Rv., 262 Pa. 33, 1O4 Adt. 857
(1918); Keinath v, Bullock, 267 Pa. 589, Io Atl. 755 (192o); McLaughlin

v. Pgh. Ry., 252 Pa. 32, 97 Atl. I07 (1916) ; Kilpatrick v. P. R. T. Co., 29o Pa.
288, 138 Atl. 830 (1927); Schlossstein v. Bernstein, 293 Pa. 245, 142 Atl. 324
(1928).
'Martin v. P. R. R.; Hoffman v. P. & L. E. R. R., both supra note . ; Dunlap v. P. R. T. Co., 248 Pa. I3O, I3, 93 Atl. 873, 874 (1915).
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result when practically any situation that may be said to be a "common purpose" in the popular use of the term is sufficient, and such cases are cited as
'
authority for the "joint enterprise" rule. It is interesting to note that, in an
action where the plaintiff was a pedestrian and the defendant was the passenger
of a private vehicle, one court held there was no liability expressly on the
ground that there was no "common purpose" or "joint enterprise".' Yet in a
case in which there seems to be even less argument for a "common purpose", but
in which the passenger was the plaintiff and the defendant was a third party
whose negligence concurred with that of the plaintiff's driver, a recovery was denied on the ground of a "common purpose" in making the trip.' Unless courts are
willing to lay down the proposition that there is a greater duty of care owing to
oneself than to others, a doctrine for which there is no foundation in either precedent or reason, it would seem that the factual distinction drawn in these two cases
is purely arbitrary. It is submitted that a "common purpose" is but an element of
a "joint enterprise", and that the doctrine of "joint enterprise" should be limited
to cases where the common right of control exists with a correlative common
responsibility to third persons for negligence in the operation of the vehicle;'
and, further, that the present use of "common purpose", with its harsh standard
of care, should be abandoned. It must be obvious that in the principal case it
would have been less confusing to have placed the nonapplicability of the "joint
enterprise" doctrine on the ground that it does not apply in an action between
the passenger and driver of the same vehicle, rather than to have considered
absence of "common purpose" in a manner which leads to the absurd inference
that had the parties been going to bowl together, a recovery might possibly have
been denied.

OF CoNDITIONAL GiFTs oR
CONDrInoN-Bill in equity to
recover engagement ring given defendant, a minor, on express condition that
she return it if she should break the engagement. She subsequently refused to
marry plaintiff, and failed to return the ring. Held, that plaintiff could not
recover. Yubas v: Witaskis, 95 Pa. Super. 296 (1929).
Classically, couris have been reluctant to enforce contracts made by infants, in order to protect them from their immaturity.' This doctrine has led
the court in the instant case to hold for the defendant on the ground that rePERSONs-LABIMITY

PAYMENT

OF DAMAGES

OF INFANTS

FOR RErURN

UPON BR-.AcH

OF THE

'Kilpatrick v. P. R. T. Co, sgpra note 4, at 294, 138 Atl. at 832, and Alperdt
v. Paige, 292 Pa. i, 6, 14o AtI. 555, 557 (1928).
I Condren v. Heintz, 79 Pa. Super. 283 (1922) (trip to decorate graves).
' Martin v. P. R. R., supra note 2.
'Coleman v. Bent, IO Conn. 527, 124 AtI. 224 (1924) ; VA. L. R:EV., supra
note I, at 344.
" U. OF PA. L. REV., supra note i ; Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131
Atl. 432 (1925).
'International Text Book Co. v. Connely, 2o6 N. Y. 188, 99 N. E. 722
(1912); (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 811. For a discussion of the infant's
liability on contracts which he disaffirms, see (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 570.
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covery against her would result in the enforcement of a contract.' However,
the real issue in the case is not one of contract, but concerns the liability of an
infant for a chattel given her on a condition which subsequently fails of fulfillment. The finding of the facts by,the chancellor in the lower court does, not
warrant the appellate court in deciding the case, on contract, since it clearly
indicates that the gift was given conditionally by the donor, and is distinct
from the contract to marry 8 If 4 gift is given to, a donee subject to certain
conditions which are either expressed by the parties ' or implied by law,' the
failure of the condition on which the gift is made gives the donor the right to
recover the chattel. or its value.' The infancy of the donee has no effect on
the donor's right of recovery, because the title revests in the donor upon the
breach of conditibn, and subsequent appropriation by the donee is an act of
conversion. While an infant is not liable for lack of care in treating property
of another,' he is liable i~f he refuses to deliver another's chattels or converts
them by other acts in denial of the rights of the owner The principal case in
refusing to grant a remedy against an infant who fails to comply with the
terms of a conditional gift makes an unwarranted sacrifice of legal principles
for the sake of advancing the policy of protection of infants into a class of
cases in which the reason for the policy disappears.
'Brunhoelzl v. Brandes, go, N. J. L. 31, ioo.At. 163 (1917); Spangler v.
Haupt, 53 Pa. Super. 545 (I913) ; I COOLEY, TORTS (3d ed. io6) 181. But

infancy is no defense to an action which is based, on tort, even though it is
contractual in form. Bristow v. Eastman, I Esp. 172 (1794) ; Elwell v. Martin,
32 Vt 27 (1859).
The chancellor's fourth finding of fact on page 3oa of the record was
as follows: "4. In discussing his prospective endowment of jewels, plaintiff
was fully conscious of the fickleness of women and of fortune, and observed
due care, in that he sought and obtained from defendant, as the condition of
the gift, that if she should go back to her former friend, Levin, she should
and would return to him the diamond ring that was to be the seal of her
promise. to marry plaintiff." Her, assent was immaterial, as an acceptance of
the gift was an acceptance of the conditions, and it fails to follow that her
acceptance of the gift resulted in a contract to return it. An exception to the
fourth finding was overruled by the Superior Court.
'Conkling v. City of Spripgfield, 39 Ill.
98 (1866) ; Berry v. Berry, 31
Iowa 415 (X871).

'Lumsden v. Arbaugh, 207 Mo. App. 561, 227 S. W. 868 (1921); Williamson v. Johnson, 62 Vt. 378, :o AtL 2y79 (i89o}; Jacobs v. Davis, [1917] 2 K. B.
532. For a discussion of implied conditions in gifts given in contenplation of
marriage, see Shumaker, The Law of Engagement Rings and the Like (1927)
3r LAw NOTES 45; Note (1929)

7 N. Y. L, REIM. 4.

'Antaramian v. Ourakian, 118 Misc. Rep. 558, 194 N. Y. Supp. 100 (1922);
Williamson v. -Johnson, supra. note 5; CHILDS, PMSONAL. PROPERTY (1914)

§

228.

"Halbert v. Halbert, 21 Mo. 277 (1855). Some jurisdictions hold a gift
invalid if a condition-that it revert be annexel Grignon v. Shope, IOO Ore.
61I, 197 Pac. 317 (192k). In such- a case title never passes to the donee and
the situation is analagous.
"Young v. Muhling, 48 App. Div. 617, 63 N. Y. Supp. 181 (Igoo). For
the treatment of the, liability of an infant for his torts, see Note (1903) 57
L. R. A. 67.3.
'Robinson v. Berry, 93 Me,320, 45 Att. 34 (-:899) ; Benedict v. Flannery.
115 Misc. 627, I89 N. Y. Supp. 1o4 (xg92)
(infancy not a shield, to prevent
the return of another's property) ; Green v. Sperry, 16 Vt. 39o (i844).
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SALs-BuYER's REFUSAL TO AccEPT GOODS-MEASURE OF DAMAGES-A
buyer refused to accept -cloth upon its delivery. Held, inter alia, that when
a buyer breaches his contract of sale, the measure of damages to which the
seller is entitled, is the difference between the price stipulated in the contract
and the market price at which the goods carn be readily sold at the time and
place of delivery; and it is the duty of the seller to minimize his loss by reselling the goods as soon as practicable after the buyer has refused to accept.
Scott v. Stoina, 121 So. 335 (La. 1929).
2
The general rule stated by the courts 1 and textwriters as to the measure
of damages when a buyer refuses to accept goods is in accord with the first
part of the court's decision in the instant case. According to the second proposition, however, there would seem to be a duty to minimize these damages by
a resale as soon as practicable after the buyer's breach. It is difficult to see
how such a subsequent sale would minimize the damages which are fixed by
the general rule, unless it be held that the price obtained at the later sale is the
only method of ascertaining the market price. Such a conclusion would depart unnecessarily from the general rule, inasmuch as a resale is in many
cases only one manner by which to compute the market price. Some cases r
have achieved the same result by allowing the resale price conclusively to
determine the market price. Another view' allows the resale price to be used
only as evidence of the market price. An English case,' moreover, adhered
rigidly to the general rule although the price eventually obtained at the resale
was higher than the market price at the date of the breach. It is submitted that
except where a resale is the only method of determining the market price, such
a departure from the general rule as suggested by the second proposition in the
principal case is both unnecessary and confusing.

'Edelstone, et a. v. Schimmel, 233 Mass. 45, 123 N. E. 333 (gi9) ; Frank
Pure Food Co. v. Dodson et aL, 281 Pa. 125, 126 Atl. 243 (1924) ; cf. UNnoRM
SALES Acr (906) § 64 (3).
22 WILLISTON,
SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 582; 2 MECHEM, S.AzEs (1901)

§ i6go.
The two propositions are often used together. Chozo Yano v. Ledman,
188 N. Y. Supp. 764 (192); Sheldon v. Argos Mercantile Corp., 194 App.
Div. 472, 185 N. Y. Supp. 513 (1920).
'Gwin v. Hopkinsville Milling Co., i9o Ala. .346,67 So. 382 (914).
Chozo Yano v. Ledman, 192 N. Y. Supp. 647 (1922) ; Henning v. W. S.
Hallman Co., 3 F. (2d) 229 (C. C. A. 7th, 1924). In these cases the goods
were actually resold, but the result is the same as requiring a resale to fix the
market price.
'Duncan et al. v. Wohl, South & Co., 2o App. Div. 737, 195 N. Y. Supp.

381

(1922).

'Jamal v. Dawood, [I916] A. C. 175 (The court in speaking of the rule
to minimize damages said, page 179: "Of course, the seller must mitigate his
damages, but the damages to be ascertained are those at the date of the breach,
and if something could have been done or was done on that date to mitigate the
damages, the buyer was entitled to the benefit thereof."). Contra: Bell Oil &
Gas Co. v. A. B. A. Independent Oil & Gas Co., III Neb. 18, 195 N. W. 461
(1923).
'See American & British Mfg. Cbrp. v. New Indria Quicksilver Mining
Co., 293 Fed. 509, 529 (C. C. A. 1st, 1923).
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STATUTES-EFFECT ON CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUING PRIOR TO AMEND.MENT
CURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT IN PREVIOUS STATUTE-Act of 1924' provided for service on Secretary of State in suit against non-resident owners of

motor vehicles operated within state. In 1927 the legislature amended 2 the act
by providing for notice to defendant. In 1928 the earlier statute was declared
unconstitutional ' for lack of a provision requiring notice to defendant. Plaintiff's cause of action arose in 1926 and service was made in 1928 in conformity
with the amended act. Held, that the unconstitutional statute of 1924, as
amended in 1927, was applicable to cause of action which accrued in 1926.
Dwyer v. Volnzar Corp., 146 Atl. 685 (N. J. 1929).
To sustain the legislatve power to cure a constitutional defect in a statute'
by amendment, and to give such amendment retroactive effect, upon a cause of
action, arising between the time of the statute and the amendment, presents a
question courts are not frequently called upon to decide.

Cases declaring a

statute unconstitutional are divided as to the effect of such a declaration, some
treating the statute as void ab initio,' others- as merely inoperative from the
time of the decision.' An amendatory statute, as well as any other legislation,
dates its existence I from the time of its passage and will not be construed as
having retroactive effect unless such appears to have been the legislative intent.'
p. L. 1924, C. 232, 517.
3

P.

L.

1927, C. 232, 441.

Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 Sup. Ct. 259 (1928) (for discussion

of case, (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 869).

'Where a statute is unconstitutional because the legislature lacks authority,
as distinguished from a mere defective exercise of that authority, such statute
cannot be vitalized by a later amendment to the constitution granting such
authority, but must be re-enacted. Banaz v. Smith, 133 Cal. lo2, 65 Pac. 309
(19O)

; Seneca Co. v. Sec. of State, 82 Mich. 573, 47 N. W. 25 (I89O).

In

the principal case the legislature had authority to enact the law. Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632 (927).
' Morton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425, 6 Sup. Ct. 1121 (1886) ; Bedford Co. v. Bough, 168 Ind. 671, So N. E. 529 (19o7) ; City of Henderson v.
Lieber's Executor, 175 Ky. 15, 192 S. W. 830 (1917) ; Cool=v, CONSTITUTIONAL

LIMITATiONS (7th ed. 19o3) 259. These courts should logically hold that subsequent statutory changes cannot make the statute constitutional. State v. Tufly,
2o Nev. 427, 22 Pac. 1054 (189o) ; State ex rel. R. R. Co. v. Whitesides, 30 S.

C. 579, 9 S. E. 661 (i889).
'In this class are decisions of the principal jurisdiction. Allison v. Cooker,
67 N. J. L. 596, 52 At]. 362 (192) ; Lang V.Mayor, 74 N. J. L. 455, 68 Atl. 90
(19o7). Under this view it would seem an unconstitutional statute may be
amended to validate it, at least so far as its future operation is concerned.
Ross v. Wright County, 128 Iowa 427, 1O4 N. W. 506 (1905) (given retroactive effect) ; State v. City of Cincinnati, 52 Ohio St. 419, 40 N. E. 508 (1895);
Allison v. Cooker, supra.
'In construing "subject matter" of an amended statute, the general rule
provides that the statute and amendment shall be read and understood as

though both had been passed as one measure. Myers v. Fortunato, 13 Del. Ch.
148, 116 Atl. 623 (1922); State v. Vendetta, 86 W. Va. 186, lO3 S. E. 53
(1920) ; BLACK, INTERPRETATION OF LAWS (2nd ed. igii) § 166.
'In re Fuetl, 247 Fed. 829 (D. Conn. 1917) ; Electric Co. v. Commissioners,
88 N. J. L. 6o3, 96 Ati. 1oi3 (1915) ; BLACK, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 170.
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Retroactive legislation is not invalid 'i f it does not interfere with vested rights 20
or come under the head of ex post facto laws." Statutes which deal with
procedure or relate solely to the remedy ' may be retroactive and are frequently
so construed."3 Under another construction it is stated remedial statutes are
per se applicable to accrued causes of action. ' The result in the instant case
is justifiable under various views, including that taken, by this court. The
opinion proceeds on the theory that the- amendment became a constituent part
of the original statute, for the court reasons that the phrase, "From and after
the passage of this act," in the amendatory statute expressly referred to the
effect to be given to the statute of 1924. This theory involves the legislative
power to amend an unconstitutional statute and can properly be applied only
by a court taking the view of the principal jurisdiction on the effect of such

a statute. In jurisdictions taking the stand that an unconstitutional statute is
.void ab initio, the result may be supported on a theory which eliminates the
necessity for dealing with an unconstitutional statute, but proceeds on the
premise that the amendatory act re-enacts the original statute and is complete
in itself; the legislative intent to make the new act retroactive as of 1924 being
found by the reference in it to the earlier act. The specific result in the instant
case may still be reached without dealing with the constitutional statute and
without considering the retroactive construction. This would be on the theory
that the statute of 1927 is prospective and that since it relates to procedure, it

may be made applicable to already accrued causes of action.

TAXATION-FoREIGN

CORPORATIONS-PROPERTY HELD UNDER BAILMENT
SUBJEcT To CAPITAL STOCK TAx-A Delaware
corporation, organized primarily to give financial assistance to purchasers of
automobiles under an assignment from the automobile dealer of the usual bailment lease plus notes covering the balance due, appeals from a tax settlement
1
made against it in Pennsylvania for capital stock taxes, the assessment including the value of all such automobiles to which the corporation held paper
title. Held, that defendant is liable for capital stock tax based on use of such
LEASE TANGI3LE PROPERTY

'Luria v. United States, 231 U. S. 9, 34 Sup. Ct. 10 (1913) ; SUTHERLAND,
647.
is not a vested right. This is the
general rule; and the exceptions are of those peculiar cases in which the remedy
is part of the right itself." COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 5 at 515.
Ex post facto, has been confined to laws respecting criminal punishments,
COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 5,at 373; note (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REV. 400.
'An act withdrawing all the property of a debtor from the operation of
legal process, leaving only a barren right to sue, is void. State v. Bank, I
S. C. 63 (1868).
"Pacific Co. v. Insurance Co., 25 Fed. (2d) 930 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928);
Devine's Case, 236 Mass. 588, 129 N. E. 414 (i92o) ; Kuca v. Coal Co., 268 Pa.
163, IIO Atl. 731 (i92o).
' Pacific Co. v. Insurance Co., Kuca v. Coal Co., both supra note 13, 389
(1927) 75 U. OF PA. L.REv.673.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (2d.ed. I904) §
10"The right to a particular remedy

'Act July 15, i919, P. L. 948, PA.

STAT.

(West,i920).
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automobiles as tangible property in carrying on its local business. Comnwnwealth v. Motors Mortgage Corp., 147 Ad. 98 (Pa. 1929).
The capital stock tax as applied to foreign corporations is a tax on the
property of these corporations situated within the state and used for business
purposes.' Since the situs of intangible personal property is the domicile of
the owner of such property, its value is not subject to this tax
The controversy hinges on whether obtaining title under the bailment lease assignment
is such an exercise of the corporation's charter privilege of buying automobiles
as to constitute an entry by the defendant into the automobile business in Pennsylvania, or whether taking title is a mere collaterilization of an accounts receivable investment, not constituting doing business within the meaning of their
charter or the statute. In refusing to look beyond the paper title and investigate
the nature of the transaction, the court pointed to the insistence with which
these companies seek protection for this title when a conversion is attempted.
Use of the title when advantageous and denial of it to avoid correlative obligations is the practice on which the court here frowns. A case cited in the
opinion as controlling, where the manufacturer himself acted as finance company,' differs somewhat in the nature of the transaction in that the whole
purpose was to secure ultimate vendees and not to obtain accounts receivable,
whereas the defendant in this case sought only to profit on a money investment, entirely apart from the sale of the physical property. Therefore, were
the decision in the principal case the other way, the two cases would still be
reconcilable. Contrary authority is found in other jurisdictions where the
arrangement is called a conditional sale and the naked title is looked on as a
mere security title.5 In addition, a recent Pennsylvania case' held that the
court would look beyond the instrument to ascertain the true nature of the
transaction. An identical bailment lease arrangement, called an equipment
trust, was there held to be a corporate obligation, making the Transit Company purchaser liable under the tax on corporate loans.! Since the transit
company was, in effect, the purchaser under the equipment trust and was taxed
for an obligatim under the loans tax, obviously the defendant in the principal
case, being on the other end of a similar transaction, holding legal title under
'Commonwealth

v. Standard Oil Co., ioi Pa. ii9 (1882).

'Commonwealth v. Ellis, 237 Pa. 328, 85 Atl. 414 (1912); 2 CooLEY,
TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 455.
'Commonwealth v. National Cash, Register Co., 271 Pa. 4o6, 117 Atl. 439
(i921) (where the manufacturer put out chattels, reserving title under a
bailment lease and taking notes for the balance due, with a provision that at
the end of the term the lessee to have the option of taking title to himself by
allowing the manufacturer to keep the original deposit).
"Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Cooper, 263 Fed. 994 (z92o); Whiting
Finance Co. v. Hopkins, i99 Cal. 428, 249 Pac. 853 (1926) ; Foundry Co. v.
Pascagoula Ice Co., 72 Miss. 6o8, 18 So. 364 (i895).
'Commonwealth v. Philadelphia Transit Co., 287 Pa. 190, 134 Atl. 455
(1926) (this case was vigorously presented by defendant in the principal case
but not
mentioned in the opinion).
T
It is interesting to note that Justice Kephart, who wrote the opinion in
the Transit Company case, supra note 6, was absent when the principal case
was determined.
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a bailment lease, must be considered as one owning the obligation of another,
which is intangible property, and not as one owning tangible property and
renting it. Technically, the court is undoubtedly right in the present case and
its decision, in addition to being fair with the finance companies, is consistent
with the holding in cases of default, when the title is deemed strong enough to
give the lessor immediate possession and a superior right, even against third
parties.! Notwithstanding this, however, there is some difficulty reconciling
holding the defendant liable for capital stock tax on the paper title security it
holds for automobiles with the inferences of the Transit Company case.
TORTS-NATURE OF CoMmoN LAW LIABILITy FOR SPREAD OF FiPR-Latent
defect in steel tank car, transported by defendant railroad for connecting
carrier under regulations of Interstate Commerce Commission, caused derailment; sparks from attendant friction ignited benzol contained in car, damaging
by fire plaintiff's adjoining property. Plaintiff brings action under statute'
imposing liability upon every railroad for all damage by fire originating upon
land of such road from its operation. Held, that defendant is liable for fire
o.f such origin under the statute, which is to be construed as a re-enactment
of the common law rule, or a reasonable extension thereof. Dickelman Mfg.
Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 34 Fed. (2d) 70 (N. D. Ohio 1929).
Did the absolute common law2 liability for spread of fire apply only to
fires kindled by the occupier of land, or did it also apply to fires originating
through his instrumentalities in some other way? The court in the principal
case does not determine the point, merely expressing a probability to the affirmative. The correct conclusion was reached, but with uncertainty caused by
undue reliance upon the leading decisions and by merely incidental consideration of fundamental principles. Since industry of the seventeenth century was
practically unacquainted with instrumentalities capable of generating fire by
accident, cases' decided solely under the common law do not apply to facts,
which establish that the defendant's instrumentalities did not involve use of
fire or conduct tending to create fire. Thus, the instant situation is only
within the common law rule as stated broadly by dicta," and not within the
rule as stated in other dicta;' therefore a study of the cases alone cannot lead
'Leitch v. Sanford Motor Truck Co., 279 Pa. 16o (1924); Hayden v.
McMillan, 79 Pa. Super. I (1922).

'Onio GEN. CoDE (Page, 1926) § 897o.

'This refers to the law of England prior to 6 ANNE c. 31, § 6 (0707),
which declared that no action should lie against "any person in whose house
or chamber any fire shall . . . accidentally begin", later extended to estates.
A two-century controversy over "accidentally begin" is continued in Edwards,
Ltd. v. Birmingham Navigations, [19241 I K. B. 341, 361.
3
Anon., Y. B. 42 Edw. III, f. 259, pl. 9 (1369), I Roll. Abr. (I668) I
(unknown origin); Beaulieu v. Finglam, Y. B. 2 Hen. IV, f. i8, pl. 6 (140)
(kindled) ; Anon., Cro. Eliz. io (Eng. 1583) (firearm); Tubervil v. Stamp, i
Salk. r3 (Eng. 1697) (kindled).
' See Filliter v. Phippard, ii Q. B. 347, 354 (1847); Denver v. Porter, 126
Fed. 288, 290 (C. C. A. 8th, i9o3).

'See Becquet v. MacCarthy, 2 B. & Ad. 951, 958 (Eng. 1831) ; St. Louis
& San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Mathews, i65 U. S. I, 22 (1896). On this point,
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to a satisfactory conclusion. In addition to precedent, the court also considered "the rule of absolute liability at common law in other cases." Although
the ancient law held every man liable for his acts irrespective of fault,' retention of strict liability in the law as to fire and animals after its relaxation in
other respects 7 has an historical basis: (i) group responsibility in pater
familiae for damage done by parts of his household, such as his fire or his
animals; (2) close identification of man with the fire and animals which played
so great a part in his religious life and in his household! These reasons for
the absolute rule apparently justify its application only to fire which is "domesticated" or of voluntary origin, i. e., where there is use of fire by the defendant, or conduct tending to create fire, as distinguished from the principal case.
However, the court further considered "that the law of negligence is of comparatively recent development". This generalization treats the situation at
issue as any tort; it either overlooks that actions for damage by fire had the
separate basis previously noted, or acknowledges that basis together with the
suggested distinction which would take the instant case out of the general
rule: in either event, the decision from such viewpoint would favor the defendant, since the law of the times had actually sustained inevitable accident
as an excuse
Thus, consideration of its fundamental aspects reduces this
problem to its lowest terms: a court of the period when the common law was
first being influenced by -the experimental trend away from liability without
fault in other fields of tort, would either draw the distinction that this case
was not within the absolute rule since the defendant did not use fire, or it
would fail to do so, influenced by centuries of holding a defendant absolutely
liable for his conduct in all cases and particularly in cases where loss by fire
was at issue. Since it is most logical that the rule imbedded in the law for
centuries regarding this type of damage would be adhered to,"' it is submitted
that at common law the occupier of land was absolutely liable not only ;for fire
he kindled, but also for fire originating through his instrumentalities in some
other way. Today, in the absence of special legislation imposing absolute
liability, negligence is the basis of recovery in both England and the United
States. t The very enactment of such legislation, and the broad construction
given the statute in the principal case, are indicative of an interesting tendency
to revert to primitive law in the modern concept of social justice."
compare the rules of 1 Coo=.E", TORTS (3d ed. i9o6) I6 and BURIlCK, ToRTs
(4th ed. 926) 13, with 3 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE (6th ed. 1913)
1729 and Pouocx, TORTS (iith ed. xg2o) 5o5, n. (r).

"Bohlen, Basis of Affirmative Obligations in Law of Tort (19o5) 53 U.

OF PA. L. REv. 209, 210, BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) 33, 34.

7Weaver v.
Jones 205 (Eng.
I See Brown
9
Supra note

Ward, Hobart 134 (Eng. 1616); Dickenson v. Watson, T.
1682).
v. Collins, 53 N. H. 442, 449 (1873).
7.

"0DIcKINSON, ADmINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND SUPREMACY or LAW (1927)
114.

31Valley Lumber Co. v. Westmoreland Bros., i59 Ark. 484, 252 S. W.
6o9 (x123).
"CARDozo, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PaocEss (1921) 26.
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TRUSTS-RIGHT OF NATIONAL BANK TO SUCCEED CONSOLIDATING TRUST
COMPANY AS EXECUTOR-A national bank merged with a trust company under

a federal statute which provided that all property rights of the trust company,
"including the right of succession as trustee, executor . . .in the same manner
and to the same extent as was held" by the trust company, should pass to the
new banking association.' The new banking association, without ever having
been appointed, filed its account as executor of an estate which the trust company had administered until consolidation. Held, that the new banking association is not entitled to account as executor, but only as executor de son tort.
Ex parte Worcester County National Bank, 49 Sup. Ct. 368 (U. S. i929).'
Under previous statutes conferring trust powers on national banks subject
to the approval of the Federal Reserve Board, it had been held that state courts
could show no discrimination in favor of state trust companies when refusing
to confer fiduciary powers on applicant national banks.' But a national bank
created by the conversion of a state trust company under the provisions of the
same acts could not administer a testamentary trust naming the trust company
as trustee, because the trust company lost its identity and was no longer the one
in whom the faith was placed.5 At this stage the statute involved in the principal case was passed 0 The Massachusetts court interpreted this as bestowing
upon the consolidated bank the absolute right to continue to act as executor
in the place of the component trust company. This construction appears to
be a reasonable and natural one,' inasmuch as it takes the language employed
at its face value, and the conclusion of the Massachusetts court that this statute,
contrary to the law of Massachusetts, deprived the Judiciary of its function of
appointing executors and was therefore unconstitutional would seem to follow.'
But the controlling construction of a federal statute is ultimately in the United
States Courts.'
Thus, the Court in the principal case was privileged to find

'44 STAT. 1224, § 1 '(1927), 12U. S. C. §34a (1928).
'Aff'g Petition of Worcester County National Bank, 263 Mass. 444, 162
N. E. 217 (1928) on the right to account as executor, but not on the same basis
as that of the Massachusetts Court.
'38 STAT. 262 § I (k) (1913), 12 U. S. C. § 248 (k) (i926), amended
40 STAT. 968 § 2

(I918),

12 U.

S.

C. §248 (k)

(1926).

'National Bank of Bay City v. Fellows, 244 U. S. 416, 37 Sup. Ct 734

(1917) ; State ex rel Burnes National Bank v. Duncan, 265 U. S. 17, 44 Sup.
Ct. 427 (1924) ; In re Turner's Estate, 277 Pa. IiO, 12o Atl. 701 (1923).
"Commonwealth-Atlantic National Bank of Boston, 249 Mass. 44o, 144
N. E. 443 (1924) (testator died before conversion); Commonwealth-Atlantic
National Bank of Boston, 261 Mass. 217, 158 N. E. 78o (i927) (testator died
after0 conversion).
Supra note i.
7
Petition of Worcester County National Bank, supra note 2. Cf. Petition
of Worcester County National Bank, 263 Mass. 394, 161 N. E. 797 (1928),
where the national bank which had been appointed executor before the consolidation was allowed to account afterwards.
. 'See Levitt, The Trust Powers of National Banks, (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L.

Rav. 835, 853.
Petition of Worcester County National Bank, sUpra note 2.
Carpenter v. Aquidneck National Bank, 46
R. I. 152, 158, 125 AtI. 358, 360; CooLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (7th
ed. i9o3) 25.
oSee principal case at 370;
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that Congress did not intend the terms of this Statute to conflict with the law
of Massachusetts :" and that the right conferred by it was merely permissive in
that it gave the consolidated bank the bare right to apply to the court for
appointment. In so holding, the Supreme Court adhered to the policy of construing ambiguous matters in favor of constitutionality,' - and settled definitely
all controversies on the point.
"The Couirt relied on the provision in the statute (supra note i) that "no
such consolidation shall be in cohtravention of the law of the state under which
such bank is incorporated".
' BLAcic, HANDBOOK OF CONsTxUCrIOij ANI INTERPRETATION OF THE LAws,
(2d ed. I911), nio, and numerous authorities there cited.

